Among the ways a product or labor market might operate is the following: All firms quote the same price or wage. Customers or job-seekers search among sellers until they find one willing to sell them or employ them. They do not need to consider the possibility that another seller or employer might offer a better deal, since all offers are i1enti, rnder prevailing prices or wages, the small participants in the market--custorners and workers--have very limited responsibilities for processing information. By contrast, where markets are equilibrated by conscious search for the best price or wage, the small participants face complex problems of gathering and interpreting information. Adherence to pervailing prices and wages may explain part of the macroeconomic puzzle of price and wage stickiness and the sensitivity of real variables to nominal disturbances.
Introduction
In some markets in the modern U. S. economy, firms seem unwilling to use variations in prices and wages to bring the product demands or labor supplies they face into line with the firms' marginal costs or marginal products of labor.
Instead, they make unilateral quantity adjustments by rationing output to customers and hiring or laying off workers. Prices and wages are held passively at levels prevailing in the relevant product and labor markets, instead of varying as part of an active policy. Economists have tended to view this phenomenon as an artifact of our inability to measure actual transactions prices instead of list prices, as the outcome of implicit or explicit long-term contracts with customers and labor, or as rule-of thumb behavior that stops short of full profit maximization. Price and wage stickiness has well-known macroeconomic implications, but there is intense disagreement among macroeconomists about the rationalization of stickiness.
This paper argues that adherence to prevailing prices and wages is one of the ways that a market can be organized efficiently. No special features of the market beyond the mutual benefit that derives from equating the marginal costs of sellers to the marginal benefits of buyers are needed to explain the use of quantity adjustments rather than price adjustments by firms. The paper starts by examining the process that brings a market into equilibrium and, specifically, asks what role prices have or could have in that process. The focus is on a market with many sellers of a homogeneous good, and even more buyers. Participants in the market have a reasonably good idea of what price will hold in equilibrium. The problem of equilibration is to spread the buyers across the sellers so as to bring the marginal cost of each seller approximately in line with the equilibrium price. Buyers must move through some kind of search process from highcost sellers to low-cost ones. The paper proposes a simple, reasonable search process and then shows that a free market could be organized in several different ways to bring about this process. The methods of organization differ primarily in the way that prices are used to distribute information.
One organizational principle lets low-cost sellers attract buyers by posting low prices and similarly lets high-cost ones repel buyers with high prices. Actual movements of buyers in an equilibrating direction occur at the initiative of buyers. The information-processing problem faced by buyers has been considered at great length in the literature on optimal search. Market organization based on sellers' use of prices to attract or discourage customers is the natural first thought of the economist about a good way for a market to get to equilibrium.
Nonetheless, it has two serious problems: First, it is difficult to detect violations of the rule that the posted price of a seller equals marginal cost.
Sellers may be tempted to raise prices above marginal cost to increase profit, but then the market will become inefficient, in that the marginal costs of sellers will not equal the marginal benefits of buyers. Second, this market organization requires sophisticated optimization and good information about the whole market on the part of large numbers of small buyers.
The key point of the paper is the availability of an alternative organizational principle that can bring about the same pattern of equilibrating movements of buyers without imposing unenforceable rules on sellers and without requiring heavy information processing by buyers. Under it, every seller posts the same price, called here the prevailing price. Buyers need not know anything about the market. They simply visit sellers until they find one who will sell to them.
Buyers always deal with the first seller who has the product available. They always pay the prevailing price. Sellers accept new buyers when marginal costs are less than the prevailing price. Sellers are price-takers and make decisions only about the quantity of output. Equilibrium is reached when quantity adjustments have brought marginal cost in line with the prevailing price.
Most of the material in the paper applies equally well to the labor market, where the roles of buyer and seller are reversed. The search theory of unemployment pictures a labor market organized in the first way: Employers use wage variations to attract and repel workers. Consequently, the job seeker faces a distribution of possible wages and tries consciously to get a wage in the upper tail of the distribution. This involves turning down wage offers until a suitably high one comes along. But organization of the labor market on the principle of the prevailing wage is an equally good way for it to reach equilibrium, and has a character that fits more closely with the evidence on actual labor markets.
Under a prevailing wage, job-seekers visit one employer after another until they find an opening, which they take immediately. All jobs pay the same wage, so there is no point in looking further. Employers equate the value of the marginal product of labor to the wage by adjusting the level of employment. Again, the firm is restricted by the rules of the market to unilateral quantity adjustments.
Plainly, not every market in a modern economy makes use of prevailing prices or wages. This method of organization seems most useful in markets for reasonably homogeneous goods or services where the agents on one side of the market are much larger than those on the other side. The clearest sign of prevailing-price or -wage market organization is the willingness of the buyer or worker to enter into the first deal that is offered, without worrying about the possibility that another seller might offer a better deal. Another sign is 'the use of unilateral quantity adjustments not induced by or accompanied by price or wage adjustments--sellers ration output to their customers or lay workers off, for example, in prevailing-price or prevailing-wage markets. Buyers derive benefits from their purchases in a way described by a benefit schedule--the nature of the benefits depends on whether the buyers are themselves firms or final consumers.
As a general matter, the efficient organization of transactions within the market achieves a balance between the reduction in deadweight loss achieved by a narrowing of the dispersion of marginal costs and the corresponding increase in search costs. If the intensity of search is characterized by one or a few parameters, then the efficient organization of the market can be described analytically by equating the marginal improvement in allocation to marginal costs of search. Characterization of the optimal pattern of search at the most general level is an unsolved problem and is certainly not the aim of this paper. Rather, a very restricted (but sensible) class of search processes is posited at the outset. The members of the class are indexed by a single parameter measuring the intensity of search. Three forms of organization that generate patterns of search within the class are considered.
The search process works in the following way: At first, buyers are assigned to sellers at random in a trial allocation. Each seller strikes an efficient bargain with the buyers assigned to him; that is, marginal cost equals the marginal benefit for each of the buyers. In the trial allocation, some sellers have high marginal costs and others low marginal costs. Any movement of buyers from highcost sellers to low-cost ones will improve the allocation. But purposeful movements toward low-cost sellers is ruled out by the constraints on information.
A buyer can know that his current seller is charging too much, but does not know the address of any specific low-cost seller. The search process has this buyer visit another seller chosen at random from all sellers. If the new seller has a marginal cost below some cutoff level, say K, the buyer joins the tentative bargain with that seller. If not, he visits another seller chosen at random.
As customary in this kind of model, the process of equilibration is pictured as taking place in the course of time, but the time is not really calendar time. This is just a convenient way to describe events that actually take place simultaneously with the completion of transactions.
It will be useful to formalize this process as follows: Let x be the fraction of buyers currently in tentative bargains where marginal cost exceeds the cutoff level, K. Let z be the fraction of sellers whose marginal costs are strictly less than the cutoff level. Suppose the flow of buyers starting to look for new sellers is Xx (since the time over which the flow occurs is not really calendar time, the numerical value of A is of no consequence. Calling the process a flow is a way to avoid having to deal with every movement at once). Now x can change in two ways: It can decline discretely at the point where one of the sellers' marginal costs reaches the cutoff point, and it can decline continuously as buyers depart from the high-cost sellers. The latter process is one of a constant percentage decline of x at a rate A. Thus x evolves according to the following kind of path:
Each departing worker has a probability z of finding a low-cost seller in each visit. Thus the expected number of visits per searcher is l/z, and the total number of visits required by the process is cx, Second, if the cutoff level K is set above the market-clearing price, p*, the fraction of buyers assigned to high-cost sellers, x, is always less than or equal to its value with K p, and the fraction of sellers with low costs, z, is at least as large as it is with K = p, so V must be smaller with higher K. Third, if the cutoff level is set below the market-clearing price, z will reach zero in finite time and V can be thought of as infinity. In all, the behavior
Organizing the Market to Attain the Search Process A particular organization of the market tells how the sequence of decisions is made that directs buyers from high-cost sellers to low-cost ones. Decisions can be made cooperatively by a seller and his associated buyers, unilaterally by the seller, or unilaterally by buyers. Prices may be merely implicit in the bargains, or they may be set explicitly by one of the parties. Three alternative types of market organization will occupy the discussion here, though it will become clear that many other types could exist as well.
First, decisions can be made jointly by sellers and buyers without any explicit use of prices. In a tentative assignment of buyers to sellers, there is an implicit price associated with their tentative bargain, namely the common value of marginal cost and marginal benefit. Unless the market is in full competitive equilibrium, some sellers will have higher implicit prices than others.
Everyone can be made better off if a buyer leaves a high-cost seller and joins a low-cost one. Thus the high-cost seller and his associated buyers can offer terms to one of the buyers which are generous enough to enable him to buy in to a lowcost seller and his associated buyers. Further, if the equilibrating process is expected not to continue past its efficient stopping point, the inducement can be large enough to cover the expected search costs of the emigrating buyer. In order to generate exactly the pattern of search prescribed in the previous section of the paper, the migration flow should occur at rate A from all sellers with implicit prices above the cutoff, K, and the migrating buyer should keep looking until he finds a seller with an implicit price below K. An alternative organization is available that resembles much more closely the way that economists think that markets work, or at least the way they should work. Sellers quote explicit prices. Their quotations do not try to maximize some kind of short-run profit, but rather are simply equal to current marginal cost. Buyers search actively for the best price. They have a fixed, uniform cutoff price, K, so that they remain with their current seller if the price is below K and migrate to other sellers (at rate X), if the current price exceeds K.
Then the pattern of search will be exactly as described earlier. This behavior on the part of buyers is known to be optimal for the case where the quoted price is the actual transaction price, barring certain anomolies (Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Rothschild (1974) ). In the present case, the quoted price is not the eventual transaction price, but the expected final price is a monotonic function of the quoted price. The optimal cutoff price, K, does not depend on the dispersion of quoted prices, but on the dispersion of actual prices when equilibration comes to a halt. This explains why K does not change as equilibration proceeds.
The more interesting and challenging question is the private optimality of the behavior of sellers proposed here. This is a well-known unsolved problem in the theory of markets with imperfect information. The notion that the buyers search actively in product markets and that workers search actively in labor markets is deeply embedded in existing theoretical work on the operation of markets with imperfect information. Clearly there is an element of reality in that model of market organization--some buyers do look extensively for the best price, and some workers do look for the best
wage. Yet a strong impression exists, especially among labor economists, that much search has a very different character. The buyer or worker looks for the first seller who has the product available or the first employer who has a job opening, and signs up with that seller or employer. It is an unanswered criticism of the search theory of unemployment that the evidence shows that most workers accept the first jobs they are offered (Gordon (1973) ), instead of comparing the wages of a number of offers. Automatic acceptance makes sense only if there is a common, prevailing price across all sellers, so that looking for a better price is pointless.
It turns out that markets can be organized efficiently along exactly these lines. Sellers all quote the same price. When a potential buyer arrives, he is accepted if current marginal cost is below the prevailing price and sent to look elsewhere if not. Further, if current marginal cost exceeds the prevailing price, the seller sends a flow of his current buyers back into the market at rate X.
This organization generates exactly the same pattern of search as prescribed earlier, where the prevailing price has the role of the cutoff value of marginal Cost.
In this market organization, sellers have all the responsibilities for gathering information and making decisions. Buyers are completely passive.
Without worrying whether a better deal is available elsewhere, they agree to buy from the first seller who is willing to sell) In addition, they accept the seller's judgment when he tells them he can't do business after all and requires 1The point that uniformity of quoted prices lessens search costs was made by Armen Alchian (1970).
them to incur further search costs without any compensation from the seller.
Though the prevailing-price organization is efficient, it rests very heavily on the discipline of sellers. A seller can victimize buyers by setting a price above the prevailing price; the buyers are not equipped to deal with that possibility. Again, as in the organization based on marginal cost pricing, a more elaborate model could incorporate longer-run considerations to limit cheating.
And, as in marginal cost pricing, a market with good prevailing-price discipline could displace one with an inefficient organization by operating at lower total cost.
Further Aspects of the Prevailing-Price Market Organization
The major point of this paper is the efficiency of the prevailing-price market organization. This section will try to draw some inferences about the role of prevailing prices in actual markets in the contemporary U. S. economy, rather than the abstract market considered up to this point. In actual markets, of course, equilibration takes place in real time, and it chases a moving target.
As factor prices change and product demand rises or falls, the appropriate prevailing price needs to change as well. Still, the case for a prevailing price as an efficient way to organize a market continues to apply. Adherence to a prevailing price seems capable of explaining some features of markets that contradict the standard theory of competitive markets with perfect information.
It is known that many sellers, especially in intermediate product markets, are deeply involved in decisions about the quantities of goods they sell to individual buyers. When a sudden burst of demand hits a paper producer, for example, or when a strike limits its output, customers are limited in their purchases to less than they would prefer to take at current prices. The seller does not try to discourage demand by quoting a higher price, but rather "puts its customers on-allocation." The efficient solution, in this case, is for customers to move to other producers, not to pay more for the output of this producer. The market organization gives the seller the responsibility for bringing about the movement. Rationing or allocation by producers is less of a puzzle in a prevailing-price market organization than in the conventional model with perfect information. In consumer goods markets, quantity is controlled by sellers through simple availability. To control the sales of gasoline, for example, service stations simply adjust the hours when they are open.
The central obstacle to the successful operation of a prevailing-price market organization is the proper adjustment of the prevailing price to new information about costs and demand. Unilateral price movements by sellers are a violation of the implicit rules of the market unless they can be justified as a needed change in the prevailing price. In the wholesale meat market in the U. S., where large changes in the prevailing prices are needed very frequently, announcement of the current prevailing prices is a function of an independent journalistic enterprise which publishes a "yellow sheet" of prices every day. This shows that a prevailing-price market organization is not limited to cases of prices that require only infrequent adjustment. In other industries, one large seller functions as a price leader and its price is accepted as the prevailing price. Elsewhere, information about current prices is exchanged informally and there is an implicit agreement that they should move together.
All of these mechanisms might alternatively be interpreted as ways to maintain price discipline in cartels. Indeed, all the examples just given are under investigation or prosecution as anti-trust violations in the U. S. today.2
But what is needed to sustain a cartel is not price discipline but quantity discipline. Sellers facing a fixed price behave like competitors, not monopolists or oligopolists. In a prevailing-price market organization that comes about just to operate the market efficiently, output decisions are made completely unilaterally by individual sellers subject to no implicit limitations.
A market controlled by a cartel could also make use of prevailing-price organization, but there is no logical connection between the two phenomena.
In markets where the duty of declaring the prevailing price is not delegated to a single agent, rules are likely to evolve that link price changes to easily observed market-wide influences. In particular, prices ought to respond quickly and fully to changes in costs affecting every producer. It is more difficult for rules to evolve to link prices to market demand, even though demand ought to influence the prevailing price in exactly the way predicted by standard supply-anddemand theory. Each firm observes its own demand, but the rules of the prevailing price prohibit a price adjustment to the firm-specific component of demand, and the firm has no good way to spearate the market and firm-specific components of demand. A large body of empirical research supports the hypothesis of speedier and stronger responses to costs than to demand (Cordon (1975) and Mork (1978) ).
The theory of prevailing prices has some points of contact with Franco 1odigliani's (1977) explanation of price rigidity among oligopolists. Modigliani argues that it is costly for an oligopoly to agree implicitly on a price, so the price wiii not respond immediately to new conditions in the market. Of course, England, a formal cartel was approved on grounds of economizing on search, in the case of the "Black Bolt and Nut Association's Agreement." See F. M. Scherer (1970) . Dennis Canton pointed out this reference.
he does not suggest that this feature is the outcome of efficient operation of the market.
Prevailing Wages in the Labor Market
The hypothesis that many labor markets are organized by the prevailing wage principle is harmonious with some known features of labor markets and with the criticisms by labor economists of formal models of equilibration in labor markets.
First is the unilateral nature of the decisions by firms to hire and discharge workers. In many (but by no means all) labor markets, workers present themselves to employers and it is more or less taken for granted that they will accept employment if offered. Job search is not a matter of finding a wage offer from the upper tail of a distribution of offers, but rather one of waiting until the first employer says yes. This only functions when employers adhere to the prevailing wage rules, of course. On the other side, a prevailing wage organization of the labor market explains why firms lay workers off rather than cutting wages. The firm has taken on the responsibility for deciding when the marginal product of labor has fallen below the prevailing wage; when it does, some workers ought to move elsewhere.
This explanation of permanent layoffsis complementary to the theory of temporary layoffs offered by Baily (1974) , Azariadis (1975) , and others. It should be noted that the empirical magnitude of quits indicates that not every decision about ending employment is made unilaterally by employers. But the bulk of changes in the level of employment of firms is accomplished by variations in new hires and layoffs--employment is not usually reduced by persuading workers to quit, for eXaml)le.
Second is the concern for wages paid elsewhere that permeates the wage determination process. Employers rely heavily on wage surveys when setting their own wages, rather than on experimentation with alternative posted wages depending on their current need or with individual negotiation of wages. The existence of wage "contours" (Dunlop (1944) ) and the notion that wages tend to move in tandem is a central aspect of labor economists' thinking about wages.
The hypothesis that labor markets follow the prevailing wage principle may provide a rationalization for this kind of behavior of wages.
The Macroeconomic Importance of Prevailing Prices and Wages
The fact that individual markets in the economy use prevailing price or wage organization does not by itself have important macroeconomic implications.
If prevailing prices and wages are functioning perfectly, they will keep supply and demand in equality at all time. Under these conditions, macroeconomic fluctuations would not be symptoms of disequilibrium. To put it another way, prevailing prices and wages do not themselves support disequilibrium analysis of the sort developed by Barro and Grossman (1971) This account of the real effects of nominal disturbances is only a slight variation of ones offered by Lucas (1972) and Barro (1976) , where incomplete information about the nature of the disturbances makes individual suppliers respond inappropriately to a nominal shock, and by Fischer (1977) , Gray (1976) , and Phelps and Taylor (1977) , where suppliers have contracts in which quantities but not prices or wages can respond to information that becomes available after the contracts are signed. But the prevailing price and wage model may lessen some deficiencies in these explanations of the real consequences of nominal shocks. The theory of incomplete information seems incapable of explaining the duration of the displacement of output and employment following an unexpected movement of the money stock. Evidence from Barro (1978) The theory of prevailing wages and prices fits in well with current thinking about the momentum of inflation. Once inflation becomes established at a certain rate, it tends to continue at that rate unless there is a sustained change in the rate of monetary growth. In markets where prevailing prices and wages change by general agreement rather than at the initiative of a single agent, inflation will have exactly this character. Obeying the prevailing-price rule will mean raising prices by, say, a percent every two months or six percent at the beginning of the selling season. Fully anticipated, built-in inflation has no important costs to a prevailing-price market. Prevailing-price market organization thrives under stable rates of monetary growth, but there are no special advantages of low as against moderate rates.
Concluding Remarks
The theory of prevailing prices and wages offers an explanation for some otherwise puzzling aspects of the operation of markets. Aggressive use of variations in prices charged and wages offered by individual firms is not necessarily a feature of an efficient market. The use of quantity adjustments instead is not necessarily a sign of departure from basic economic postulates. But a market organized with prevailing prices, or indeed one organized in any of the efficient ways described here, is one where firms must obey a set of implicit rules of the marketplace. The unsolved problem in this line of thought is how those rules come into being and how they are kept in operation, especially when new firms enter the market.
